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NOTES
MANDATORY HIV TESTING: AN
ORWELLIAN PROPOSITION
The acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS") epidemic
descended upon an unsuspecting American public in the early
1980's,' its onset characterized by widespread ignorance, fear,
and prejudice. At its inception, the disease was primarily asso-
ciated with two classes of individuals: homosexuals and intrave-
nous drug users.2 This unfortunately lead the majority of citi-
zens to believe erroneously that the spread of the disease could
be confined to these minority populations. Proponents of gay
and lesbian rights, fearing further discrimination, called upon
Congress and various state legislatures to enact legislation that
would protect public health while providing those afflicted with
AIDS or its causative agent, human immunodeficiency virus
("HIV"), the protections painstakingly guaranteed by the Consti-
tution.' These politicians responded accordingly and passed ex-
1 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALITY WKLY. REP. 250-52 (1981); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Update on Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS)-United States 1982, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
507-14 (1982); see also AIDS AND THE LAW § 1.2, at 3 (David W. Webber ed., 3d ed.
1997)..
2 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., Results of a Gallup Poll on Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome-
New York City, United States, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WELY. REP. 513-14
(1985). "When asked, '[wiho is the most likely to have AIDS?' one-half to two-thirds
of all respondents mentioned homosexual men. In answer to the same question,
N.Y.C. respondents were two to three times more likely to mention intravenous (IV)
drug abusers .... Id.; see also CHARLES PERROW & MAURO F. GUILLEN, THE AIDS
DISASTER 1-10 (1990).
" See Thomas B. Stoddard & Walter Rieman, AIDS and the Rights of the Indi-
vidual, in A DISEASE OF SOCIETY: CULTURAL & INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO AIDS
241, 256-63 (Dorothy Nelkin, et al. eds., 1991).
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tensive legislation to ensure the confidentiality of both AIDS and
HIV-related information in an effort to protect the constitutional
rights of afflicted individuals.4
While society's ignorance regarding AIDS and HIV has dis-
sipated in recent years, its prejudice regrettably has not. The
plethora of medical, social, ethical, and legal implications sur-
rounding the disease has led to the "resurgence of aggressive
public health measures "' as a means of combating the disease
and the concomitant erosion of many of the privacy protections
established in the early years of the epidemic. The sanctity of
confidential HIV information, once deemed inviolable, has been
severely diminished in the face of pressing public policy concerns
as numerous states have attempted to reinstate intrusive public
health disease control measures,6 thus posing "new threats to
confidentiality."7 Foremost among these "new threats"8 are pro-
posals to implement mandatory HIV testing for specific classes
of individuals considered high risks of contracting or transmit-
ting the disease.9 As such, women of child-bearing age, who cur-
rently comprise the fastest growing segment of the HIV-infected
population in the United States, and their newborns, have been
deemed primary candidates for mandatory testing."0 The subject
of mandatory HIV testing, as it pertains to these particular
groups, has raised numerous constitutional and statutory impli-
cations. Opponents of mandatory testing have alleged that such
measures would violate numerous constitutional provisions in-
" See Martha A. Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and Abuses, 16 AM. J.L. & MED.
34, 49 (1990) (noting that by 1987 seventeen states enacted laws controlling disclo-
sure of BIV-related information).
' Roger Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information:
Responding to the Resurgence of Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic,
82 CAL. L. REV. 111, 115 (1994).
6 Such measures include mandatory name reporting, partner notification, con-
tact tracing, quarantine, and isolation. For a general discussion of these methods,
see id. at 118-22.
7 Id. at 114.
8 Id.
' See Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the Rationality of Mandatory Testing for
the HIV Antibody: Balancing the Governmental Public Health Interests with the In-
dividual's Privacy Interest, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 327, 337-39 (1991) (discussing vari-
ous proposals for mandatory HIV testing of groups who are at high risk of trans-
mitting the disease and those who are at high risk of being exposed to the disease).
'o See Karen L. Goldstein, Note, Balancing Risks and Rights: HiV Testing Re-
gimes for Pregnant Women, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLVY 609, 609 (1995) (noting
that the number of women of child-bearing age infected with IUV is "increasing
nearly four times as fast as men of that age").
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cluding the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," the Due Process Clause of the Fifth2 and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Fourth Amendment protection against unrea-
sonable search and seizure, 3 and the right to privacy, a right
implicit within various constitutional guarantees enumerated in
the Bill of Rights.'4
Part I of this Note provides background information regard-
ing pediatric AIDS as well as the proposed solution of mandatory
testing. Part II begins with a brief overview of the origin of the
constitutional right to privacy and then focuses on the develop-
ment of the right to informational privacy and its role in HIV
privacy jurisprudence. Part HI commences with an analysis of
the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing of employees and
draws comparisons between such testing and mandatory HIV
testing. Part IV reviews of proposals for the mandatory HIV
testing of newborns and discusses the constitutional, social, and
economic deficiencies of such proposals. Finally, Part V dis-
cusses the potential implications of validating the mandatory
testing of newborns for HIV.
I. PEDIATRIC HW: THE PUSH FOR MANDATORY TESTING
Sources estimate that by the year 2000 there will be ten
million children worldwide infected with HIV." The United
States, where approximately six to seven thousand infants are
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person ... the
equal protection of the laws.").
See id. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law....").
13 See id. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons ...
against unreasonable searches and seizures .... ").
'4 The Supreme Court recognizes that "[viarious guarantees [in the Bill of
Rights] create zones of privacy." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965);
see Zablockl v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (marriage and procreation);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parent/child relationships); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (noting "[iut is a promise of
the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may
not enter"); cf Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (holding
that a competent person has a "liberty interest" in refusing a possible life saving
medical treatment). See generally JOHN E. NOWACK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.26, at 795 (5th ed. 1995); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-1, at 1302 (2d ed. 1988).
' See TRACEY HOOKER, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
HIV/AIDS FACTS TO CONSIDER: 1996, at 14 (1996).
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born to HIV positive mothers each year,16 will account for a sub-
stantial percentage of that number. These children have little
chance for survival and many will die before reaching their sec-
ond birthday.'7 Moreover, according to the Center for Disease
Control, it costs approximately $240 million a year to care ade-
quately for these children, perhaps the most pitiable victims of
the epidemic, infected through no fault of their own. 8 These
staggering figures have caused public uproar, leading many gov-
ernment officials to advocate coercive measures in an effort to
remedy the problem and placate their constituents. 9 Mandatory
HIV testing of newborns, considered by many to be the most
highly controversial of these measures, has moved to the fore-
front in recent years and as a result has been the subject of in-
tense political debateY
The call for mandatory HIV testing has resounded through-
out the country in the effort to stem the tide of pediatric AIDS
cases.2' The majority of these cases are attributable to maternal-
fetal, or perinatal transmission' of the virus. These transmis-
16 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 610.
17 See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., U.S. Public Health Service Recommendations For Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Counseling and Voluntary Testing For Pregnant Women, 44
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1-15 (1995) (noting that ten to twenty percent
of children perinatally infected with HIV die by age two).
18 See HOOKER, supra note 15, at 15.
1 See Eisenstat, supra note 9, at 327 (noting that "mandatory testing proposals
have arisen largely as a public response, characterized by fear, frustration and an-
ger at the disease itself and at those who have been infected").
20 The intense political debate has been the subject of many law review articles.
See generally Elizabeth B. Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women
and Newborns Must Fail: A Legal, Historical, and Public Policy Analysis, 3
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 13 (1996); Eisenstat, supra note 9; Doughty, supra note 5;
Goldstein, supra note 10; Suzanne M. Malloy, Comment, Mandatory H1V Screening
of Newborns: A Proposition Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1185
(1996); see also Deborah L. Shelton, Is it Time to Require H1V Testing for Pregnant
Women, It Just May Be, NEWSDAY, Dec. 23, 1996, at B13 (discussing "growing na-
tional debate ... centered on mandatory HIV testing of all pregnant women ... ").
2S See Cooper, supra note 20, at 18 (noting that "legislation has been introduced
in New York, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Florida, among other states, and the
U.S. Congress, that would result in the mandatory testing of newborns or pregnant
women").
2See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 612; see also HOOKER, supra note 15, at 15
(recognizing that HIV can also be transmitted to infants and children from a trans-
fusion of infected blood and blood products or from sexual abuse by an infected per-
son); Penelope Ploughman, Public Policy versus Private Rights: The Medical, Social,
Ethical, and Legal Implications of the Testing of Newborns for HIV, 10 AIDS & PUB.
POLT J. 182, 185 (1995-96) (stating that "[v]ertical transmission of HIV accounts for
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sions can occur in any one of three ways: 1) in utero through the
placenta; 2) during labor and delivery when the infant comes
into contact with maternal blood and genital tract secretions; or
3) postpartum, through breastfeeding The recent development
of AZT, a drug which has been shown to reduce perinatal
transmission of HIV by as much as two-thirds (67.5 percent),2 4
has caused a dramatic increase in support for these mandatory
testing schemes. Proponents of mandatory testing have repeat-
edly emphasized and relied upon the potential benefits of AZT
therapy when attempting to justify a state's infringement of the
constitutional rights of prospective mothers through the imple-
mentation of mandatory testing programs.'
Yet, of considerable import, is the fact that only fifteen to
thirty percent of infants born to HIV-infected mothers will ulti-
mately be infected.26 While all newborns of infected mothers will
initially test positive for HIV antibodies, approximately seventy
to seventy-five percent of the infants will "sero-convert" within
eighteen months after birthY. Consequently, the tests serve only
as an accurate indication of the HIV status of the infants' moth-
ers rather than that of the infants.' As a result, the testing
93.5% of pediatric HIV cases").
23 See HOOKER, supra note 15, at 15; Goldstein, supra note 10, at 612.
24 See HOOKER, supra note 15, at 47; Ploughman, supra note 22, at 183
(reporting a reduction in maternal transmission from 25.5% to 8.3%). But see Coo-
per, supra note 20, at 19 (discussing data from a clinical trial of perinatal use of
AZT). The article states that "the significantly reduced transmission rates experi-
enced in the trial are not expected to be fully replicated when women are faced with
tangible concerns not present in the trial context, such as limited access to health
care." Id.
25 See Christina Kent, AMA Reaffirms Mandatory HIV Testing in Pregnancy,
AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 23, 1996, at 8, available in 1996 WL 11860597 (explaining
how proponents of mandatory IV testing state their view is correct ethically and
scientifically because AZT decreases the likelihood of transmission from mother to
child).
2' See HOOKER, supra note 15, at 15. The statistics regarding maternal trans-
mission often varied depending on the source. A transmission rate of approximately
25% was the most widely reported in the various sources.
27 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 612 n.16. "Seroconversion occurs when the
blood (serum) changes (converts) from positive to negative in HIV antibody testing."
Id.; see also Malloy, supra note 20, at 1190-91 (describing the inaccuracy of HIV
tests in newborns). Malloy explains that the most commonly used tests, which de-
tect the presence of HIV antibodies, rather than the virus itself, are ineffective in
testing newborns, who can retain their mother's antibodies up until they reach six
months of age. See id. Thus, "[any antibodies to HIV detected in the newborn are
necessarily the mother's, which have been transplacentally transmitted to the in-
fant." Id. at 1191 (citations omitted).
28 See Malloy, supra note 20, at 1191 ("When the antibody test is used, the
1998]
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scheme is viewed by many as a pretense for the mandatory
testing of pregnant women without their consent,29 and as such,
a violation of their constitutional rights, particularly their right
to privacy.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Origins of the Right
Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the
right to privacy, the United States Supreme Court, through a
series of cases," has established that such a right is implicit
within the various constitutional guarantees of the Bill of
Rights.3 Since its initial mention in Justice Brandeis' dissenting
opinion in Olmstead v. United States3 2 as "the right to be let
alone,""3 the right to privacy has permeated American jurispru-
dence.' The Supreme Court first officially recognized the right
to privacy in the landmark decision of Griswold v. Connecticut.5
In Griswold, the Court affirmatively established that the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution inherently encompasses "zones of pri-
vacy," protecting individual citizens from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusions into the most personal aspects of life. 6
mother's HIV status is revealed while the newborn's status remains in question.").
29See Ploughman, supra note 22, at 183 (referring to newborn testing as
"indirect maternal testing").
" See supra note 14.
"' See MARTIN GUNDERSON ET AL., AIDS: TESTING AND PRIVACY 77 (1989)
("Privacy has been grounded by various Supreme Court justices in the First
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."); see also supra note 14.
2 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis argued that "the right
to be let alone [was] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men" as envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. Id. In Olmstead, the
majority of the Court stated that the Fourth Amendment was limited to "material"
searches in holding that wiretapping was not unconstitutional. Id. at 464.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997) (citing the long
line of cases recognizing that in addition to freedoms expressly guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause recognizes fundamental liberty interests); see
also supra note 14.
a 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a Connecticut statute that criminalized the
use of contraceptives by married persons).
3 1d at 484. The Griswold Court located this "zoneD of privacy" in the
"penumbra" of the constitutional guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights. Id. The
precise source of the right however remained open to interpretation for several
years following the Griswold decision. Ultimately, the right was determined to be
located within the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty. See Roe v.
[Vol. 72:103
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Since recognizing the right in Griswold, the Court has
struggled with the task of defining its parameters. These strug-
gles have ensued in the face of novel, and at times attenuated,
contentions made by individuals asserting violations of their pri-
vacy rights. 7 As such, the right to privacy has proven to be "an
elusive constitutional freedom," 8 its precise scope subject to ex-
pansion and contraction since its acceptance in Griswold.9
While matters pertaining to marriage," family,4 and procrea-
tion" have been specifically afforded constitutional privacy pro-
tection, the Court has refused to extend such protection to ac-
tivities considered to conflict with the nation's history and
traditions, such as homosexual activity.4"
In recent years, the right to privacy has been determined to
encompass the right to make personal decisions regarding medi-
cal treatment, including the right to refuse such treatment alto-
gether." This aspect of the right of privacy is of particular rele-
vance with regard to mandatory HIV testing since this privacy
right should include the right to refuse knowledge regarding
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 n.23
(1977).
"7 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238 (1976) (refusing to allow a privacy claim to invalidate a regulation of hair length
for policemen).
Kevin J. Cumin, Note, Newborn HIV Screening and New York Assembly Bill
No. 6747-B: Privacy and Equal Protection of Pregnant Women, 21 FORDEAI URB.
L.J. 857, 869 (1994).
See id at 869-70 (describing the right to privacy as alternatively "'the right to
be let alone' ... the right to be free from 'unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy'" and a" 'substantive libert[y]' that should not be subjected ... to an
'undue burden.' ") (citations omitted).
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding a statute which prevented
interracial marriages unconstitutional).
"' See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a state law banning
distribution of contraceptives on grounds that it is an individual's right to decide
whether to bear children or not).
4 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (recognizing con-
stitutional limitations on a state's right to interfere with a woman's decision regard-
ing procreation and abortion); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (holding that the right to privacy is
broad enough to include a woman's right to decide whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy).
43 See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (holding that the right to privacy does not encom-
pass the right to engage in homosexual sodomy because such activity has no roots in
our nation's history and traditions). But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(holding that a state cannot regulate the private possession of obscene materials).
"See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
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one's HIV status, particularly in situations with minimum risk
of HIV transmission.45
B. The Right to Privacy in Personal Information
At least three strands of the multi-faceted right to privacy
have been identified.4' Of particular importance in the context of
HIV and AIDS is the individual's right to informational privacy,
a right which has been recognized, but which has never been
clearly defined.47 In Whalen v. Roe,4" the first case to consider
whether a fundamental right to informational privacy existed,
the Court, drawing upon prior case law, identified two distinct
aspects of the right to privacy: "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters";49 and "the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.""
The Whalen Court was confronted with a New York law which
required physicians to disclose to the State the names of those
patients known by them to be recipients of specified prescription
drugs.5 The names of such patients were stored in a central
computer file at the Department of Health in Albany, which
could only be accessed by a limited group of Department of
Health employees.52 After weighing the State's "broad latitude in
45 See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
46 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 630. These include the fundamental right to
privacy, the right to privacy of information and publication, and informed consent
and the right to bodily integrity. See id. at 630-35.
47 See Doughty, supra note 5, at 148 ("The Court has acknowledged, but has not
clearly demarcated, a right to privacy in personal information."); see also Francis S.
Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 133 (1991) (providing a general overview of the Court's decisions regarding
the right to informational privacy).
48 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
4" Id. at 599 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J. dissenting)); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the
First Amendment protects private viewing of obscene materials).
60 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (citations omitted). The Court
stated that, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), it had identified "these deci-
sions as [those] dealing with 'matters relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, and child rearing and education.' "Id. at 600 n.26.
51 Id. at 591. The law was enacted as a means of evaluating the state's drug-
control laws, found to be "deficient in several respects." Id. at 591-92. The drugs
specified by the legislature and the New York State Department of Health as being
subject to the reporting requirements were those considered to be potentially harm-
ful or addictive under federal law, including opium, cocaine, methadone, ampheta-
mines, and methaqualone. See id. at 593 n.8.
12 See id. at 593-94. "Public disclosure of the identity of patients is expressly
prohibited by ... statute and by a Department of Health regulation." Id. at 594.
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experimenting with possible solutions to problems of vital local
concern"53 against the individual patient's interests in non-
disclosure and autonomy, the Court concluded that "neither the
immediate nor the threatened impact of the patient-
identification requirements in the [statute] ... [was] sufficient to
constitute an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."' While the Court did uphold the law,
it did so only after weighing the State's interest with the indi-
vidual's privacy interest in personal medical information."
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 6 decided in
the same term as Whalen v. Roe, the Court "reiterated Whalen's
recognition of the individual's interest in non-disclosure and
formally enunciated the balancing test introduced in the earlier
case." 7 This test essentially requires a court to weigh the public
interest served by the statute against the effect of its intrusion
on the privacy rights of individuals.58
' Id. at 597.
54 Id. at 603-04.
6' See id. at 598-600. The Whalen Court concluded that this right to privacy was
located within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment's right to personal liberty.
Id. at 599 n.23. While the Whalen v. Roe Court recognized the privacy interests of
these patients, it did not expressly articulate a fundamental right to privacy regard-
ing personal medical information. The case, however, has often been cited as having
done just that. See, e.g., Kimberlin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 788 F.2d 434,
438 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe ... recognized a constitu-
tional interest 'in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.' ") (citing Whalen, 429
U.S. at 599); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
the public is served by disclosure of a senator's financial statements though ac-
knowledging "[tihe Supreme Court has clearly recognized that the privacy of one's
personal affairs is protected by the Constitution"); see also Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 767 (1986) (furthering the
theory that individuals must be afforded due process protection against government
disclosure of personal information and stating that "Pennsylvania's [abortion] re-
porting requirements raise the specter of public exposure and harassment of women
who choose to exercise their personal, intensely private, right, with their physician,
to end a pregnancy"); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983)
(afrming that "privacy of personal matters is a protected interest").
c 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (rejecting privacy challenge by former President Nixon to
a federal law authorizing seizure and examination of his documents and tape re-
cordings for purposes of determining which ones were personal in nature and which
ones were of historical value).
57 Cumin, supra note 38, at 872.
"See id; see also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458. The Nixon Court, however, recognized
that Nixon's privacy interests were not as great as the ones exerted in Whalen, cit-
ing such factors as the small fraction of records which were truly private in nature,
the need for the screening process to determine which ones were truly private and
the appellant's status as a public figure. Id- at 465.
1998]
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Circuit courts have developed several criteria to assist the
lower courts in implementing the Whalen-Nixon balancing test.59
Foremost among these criteria are those developed by the Third
Circuit in its opinion in United States v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.60
The Westinghouse court assessed the constitutionality of a
government study requiring employers to release confidential
medical files of their employees to government officials conduct-
ing research designed to improve occupational health and
safety.61 While the Westinghouse court recognized the existence
of the right to informational privacy, 62 it noted that the right was
necessarily limited in scope stating that "the right of an individ-
ual to control access to her or his medical history is not absolute
... public health or other public concerns may support access to
facts an individual might otherwise choose to withhold."' Thus,
an individual's right in personal information is not an inviolable
one, subject per se to constitutional protection. Rather, one
commentary has noted that "once a privacy interest in certain in-
formation is identified, courts [must] weigh that interest against
the interests supporting disclosure."' The complexity associated
with this weighing of interests prompted the Westinghouse court
to create a list of factors to be considered when determining
whether the state's interest in disclosure outweighs the individ-
"See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
narrowness of the purpose for which the disclosed information will be used and
whether the information is truly private or public are relevant factors in the balanc-
ing analysis); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 182 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
that since the information on the exterior of envelopes passes through many hands,
privacy interests are not implicated in such information); Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134-
35 (recognizing the public interest concerns in the disclosure of financial informa-
tion of elected officials).
"638 F.2d 570, 572 (3d Cir. 1980) (reconciling "the privacy interests of employ-
ees in their medical records with the significant public interest in research designed
to improve occupational safety and health").
Id. at 572-73. Here, the employer, Westinghouse, denied access of such rec-
ords to officials of OSHA who were studying levels of hexahydrophthalic anhydride,
a substance suspected of causing allergic reactions in plant employees. See id. at
572.
6Id. at 577 (noting that the right to informational privacy extends to various
interests).
6Id. at 578.
6Doughty, supra note 5, at 149. In delineating the standard of review, Doughty
writes, "courts employ an intermediate standard of review, requiring more than a
mere rational basis for the government's action but not subjecting that action to
strict scrutiny." Id.
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ual's right to privacy including:
[Tihe type of record requested, the information it does or might
contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsen-
sual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in
which the record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to
prevent unauthorized disclosure, the degree of need for access,
and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated
public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating
toward access.6
After considering these various factors, the court ultimately
found that the interest of employees in keeping information con-
tained within their medical records private was outweighed by
the government's interest in obtaining data relating to occupa-
tional health and safety.68 Despite its holding in favor of the
government, however, the court reiterated the position of the
Whalen Court in acknowledging that the right to privacy could in
fact be extended to cover the information contained in the medi-
cal records of individual employees."'
These Westinghouse factors are of particular relevance when
determining the legitimacy of mandatory testing and disclosure
of HIV test results of newborns. While the unique implications
of a positive test result would seem to militate in favor of the
individual's right to privacy, the public policy concerns surround-
ing the disease may sway the opinion of the courts in the oppo-
site direction, leading them to favor governmental interests as in
Westinghouse." As such, the balancing test emerges as an in-
adequate constitutional safeguard for mothers afflicted with the
disease who may have subjected their offspring to the virus
through vertical or perinatal transmission.
C. HIV and the Right to Privacy
The concept of a right to privacy regarding one's HIV status
stems from the Whalen Court's recognition that certain personal
information is constitutionally protected."9 In addition, modern
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578.
6 See id. at 580.
See id. at 577 ("There can be no question that an employee's medical records,
which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of
materials entitled to privacy protection.").
8 See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
69 See Doughty, supra note 5, at 151 ("The same balancing test between the
state and individual interests applies to cases concerning HIV-related information
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courts repeatedly rely upon the balancing test regarding an in-
dividual's privacy right and the interests of the state, as applied
in Whalen7° and Nixon,7' in determining whether the disclosure
of one's HIV status is constitutionally permissible.72
The right to maintain the confidentiality of HIV status first
arose within the prison context. In Woods v. White,73 members of
a prison medical staff disclosed to non-medical personnel and
inmates that the plaintiff had tested positive for AIDS.74 The
federal district court for the Western District of Wisconsin held
that an individual-even a prison inmate-possessed a
"constitutional right to privacy in his medical records."75 The
court found this to be especially true in the context of AIDS as a
result of its common association with sexual activity and intra-
76
venous drug use.
Expanding upon the rationale of the Woods court, and
bringing it out of the limited prison context, the court in Doe v.
Borough of Barrington77 asserted that the normal privacy inter-
est in one's medical records was greater with respect to the AIDS
virus because of the "stigma that attaches with the disease."78
Recognizing the extremely sensitive nature of AIDS, the Bar-
rington court held that such information is constitutionally pro-
tected.79 Many believe that this holding suggests that the right
as it does to other informational privacy cases.").
70 429 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1977).
71 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977).
72 See Doughty, supra note 5, at 151.
"689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988), affd, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990).
74 Id. at 874.
75 Id. at 876. The Woods court found that "[t]he right to privacy [was] not termi-
nated by conviction for a crime." Id.; see also Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234,
1237 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a prisoner had a right to privacy in precluding
prison officials from disclosing his HIV status to his fellow inmates without his con-
sent). The court in Doe noted that "there are few matters of a more personal nature,
and there are few decisions over which a person could have a greater desire to ex-
ercise control, than the manner in which he reveals [an AIDS] diagnosis to others."
Id.
76 [G]iven the most publicized aspect of the AIDS disease, namely that it is
related more closely than most diseases to sexual activity and intravenous
drug use, it is difficult to argue that information about this disease is not
information of the most personal kind, or that an individual would not
have an interest in protecting against the dissemination of such informa-
tion.
Woods, 689 F. Supp. at 876.
7729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).
7Id. at 384.
7Id. at 385. In addition, the court found that "[tihe right to privacy in this in-
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to privacy should be afforded a more expansive interpretation
when dealing with one's desire to keep HIV-related information
confidential.0
Approximately four years after Barrington, the Second Cir-
cuit articulated a broad interpretation of the right to privacy in
Doe v. City of New York.8 The plaintiff in Doe alleged that the
city violated his constitutional right to privacy for allegedly dis-
closing private information which lead to discrimination and
embarrassment. 82 Despite a confidentiality clause in the settle-
ment agreement, the City of New York's Commission on Human
Rights issued a press release describing the details of a settle-
ment between Doe and Delta Airlines, the company that ac-
quired Pan American Airlines during bankruptcy.' Doe had
previously filed a complaint against Delta on the grounds that
Delta did not hire Doe because of Doe's suspected HIV status."
The court found that the plaintiff's privacy rights had in fact
been violated, stating that "[ilndividuals who are infected with
the HIV virus clearly possess a constitutional right to privacy re-
garding their condition."' The court characterized the right of
privacy in this instance as a right to "confidentiality" in one's
personal medical information 6 and found that the severe societal
consequences accompanying disclosure of one's HIV status made
the extension of the right not only logical, but necessary. 87 In
addition to the Second Circuit, several other courts take the po-
sition that one's HIV status is constitutionally protected infor-
mation.'
formation extends to the members of AIDS patient's immediate family." Id. The
court stated that family members of an AIDS patient "suffer from disclosure just as
the victim does" and thus have a "substantial interest in keeping this information
confidential." Id.
' See, e.g., Missouri ex. rel. Callahan v. Kinder, 879 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994).
81 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1994).
2 I- at 265.
8 See id
8 See id.
Id at 267 (emphasis added).
See id The court's characterization of the right as one of confidentiality was
done in order "to distinguish it from the right to autonomy and independence in de-
cision-making" also identified in Whalen. Id
8 See id ("An individual revealing that she is HIV seropositive potentially ex-
poses herself not to understanding or compassion but to discrimination and intoler-
ance, further necessitating the extension of the right to confidentiality over such in-
formation.").
8 See, e.g., Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d 1133, 140 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[Tlhere still exists
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However, this clearly recognized privacy right can be over-
come by a significant interest in disclosure. 9 For example, in the
case of In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center,90 the court
broached the subject of the unauthorized disclosure of the HIV-
positive status of an obstetrics/gynecology resident to several of
his colleagues and several hundred of his former patients.9 The
resident, known by the court as "John Doe," failed to convince
the court that the nature of the disclosure violated his right to
privacy because it was unsubstantiated by a compelling need.92
The hospitals which employed Doe argued that there was in fact
a compelling need to disclose.93 Specifically, they claimed that
such a limited disclosure was necessary in order to prevent
transmission of the AIDS virus to patients, to "protect the other
health [care] professionals from stigmatism and to alleviate any
'mass hysteria' that could result from a general disclosure." Af-
ter weighing Doe's privacy interests against the public's interest
in disclosure, the court concluded that the hospitals acted within
constitutional boundaries when disclosing Doe's HIV status
without his consent." The court stated that Doe's involvement in
invasive procedures transformed his medical problem into a mat-
ter of "public concern the moment he picked up a surgical in-
strument and became a part of a team involved in [such] ... pro-
cedures."" Thus, while the court recognized the doctor's privacy
right, it found that right to be overcome by the hospitals' interest
in preserving the public health "regardless of the small potential
for transmittal of the fatal virus."9"
a risk of much harm from non-consensual dissemination of the information that an
individual is inflicted with AIDS."); Cook v. American Nat'l Red Cross, No. 97-1331-
MILB, 1998 WL 46399, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 29, 1998) (recognizing the constitutional
implications of involuntary disclosure). But see Middlebrooks v. State Bd. of Health,
No. 191079, 1998 WL 4751, at *2 (Ala. Jan. 9, 1998) (holding that given the risk of
the spread of AIDS, involuntary disclosure is not "an impermissible invasion of pri-
vacy").
See Doughty, supra note 5, at 151.
0595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), affd, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993).
9' I& at 1291-93. The resident (pseudonym "John Doe") was working alternately
between the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center and the Harrisburg Hospital at the
time of the disclosure. As a result, his status was revealed to staff members and pa-
tients at both hospitals. See id.
9See id, at 1296.
"See id- at 1293.
See ia at 1297.
Id. at 1298 (emphasis omitted).
I& at 1297.
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Disclosure can also outweigh privacy interests where an in-
dividual's HIV status is at issue in a legal proceeding. In Doe by
Doe v. Roe, 8 the plaintiff lapsed into a coma and suffered severe
neurological damage within three days of giving birth to her first
child." She was diagnosed as having thrombotic thrombocy-
topenia purpura ("TTP"). Some months later, the plaintiff tested
positive for HIV.'o In a suit for medical malpractice against her
physician, the plaintiff deleted her HIV results from her medical
records, despite an agreement to share such information.!0 ' The
court rejected the plaintiffs motion seeking a protective order,
refusing to accept the argument that disclosure must be related
to a public health or safety concern."° So long as the probative
value of evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect of that evi-
dence, it is within a court's discretion to require that it be
brought forward.' 3
IiI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY ilV TESTING
A. Mandatory Drug Testing in the Workplace: A Precursor to
the HIV Cases
The constitutionality of mandatory testing first arose in ar-
eas outside the HIV context. In recent years, employee groups
launched constitutional attacks on the ability of their respective
government employers to institute mandatory drug testing pro-
grams as a condition precedent to their continued employment."°
' 444 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). For cases applying an analysis similar
to that of Doe, see Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991) (declining to
find a violation of privacy where a doctor revealed the patient's HIV status to the
media during the pendency of a patient's malpractice action against a doctor);
Agosto v. Trusswal Sys. Corp., 142 F.R.D. 118, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding limited
disclosure of a patient's HIV status required when necessary to calculate lost earn-
ings capacity of a patient in a suit brought by the plaintiff against his or her em-
ployer); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. App.
1987) (ordering a hospital to reveal names of blood donors to a plaintiff suing a
hospital after receiving an infusion of HIV infected blood and having no other prob-
able means of proving her case).
Doe, 444 N.W.2d at 439.100 See id
101 See id.
101 See id at 441.
'0 See id. at 442.
104 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989) (challenging a U.S. Customs Service drug screening program which required
all employees seeking a transfer or a promotion to positions requiring the carrying
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These employees have specifically alleged that such programs
violate their expectations of privacy, grounded in the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and sei-
zure."5 While the Court has acknowledged that mandatory blood
and urine tests for purposes of determining drug use are
"searches" within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment,"8
they have found such searches to be constitutionally permissible
under the "special needs" doctrine articulated in O'Connor v. Or-
tega.
7
The leading cases upholding the constitutionality of manda-
tory employee drug testing are Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n... and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab." The complainants in Skinner brought suit challenging
the railroad's policy of subjecting employees to mandatory blood
and urine tests following major train accidents."0 In Von Raab,
the petitioners, United States Customs employees, contested a
Customs Department policy which required all Customs employ-
ees seeking promotion to positions in drug interdiction or posi-
tions requiring the use of firearms or classified materials to
submit to mandated drug testing before they could be considered
for such positions."' The Supreme Court upheld the mandatory
of firearms, or the handling of "classified" material, to submit to urinalysis); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (challenging a Federal Rail-
road Administration regulation requiring railroads to subject employees to blood or
urine tests following certain major train accidents).
'05 See National Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 663; Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 617.
1 6 See National Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 663; Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 617.
107 480 U.S. 709 (1987). The case involved the search of the desk and work area
of a state hospital employee suspected of mismanagement. See id. at 712-14. The
court held that a public employer's search would be considered reasonable where
"substantial government interests in the efficient and proper operation of the
workplace" outweighed the employee's privacy interests. Id. at 725. This balancing
test employed by the Court has been identified in later cases as the "special needs"
doctrine. National Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 666; Skinner, 489 U.S. at
620.
'0o 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
'o9 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
'1 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. The Federal Railroad Administration promul-
gated these regulations following its determination that alcohol and drug abuse by
railroad employees posed a significant problem with respect to safety on the rail-
roads. See id at 606-08.
. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61. The Commissioner of Customs, in mandat-
ing the drug testing, reasoned that these positions in the agency demanded drug
free employees as they would face safety issues and life and death decisions. See id.
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testing programs in both instances, finding that such testing
clearly fell within the purview of the "special needs" doctrine de-
lineated in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." In
Skinner, the Court considered the railroad's interest in public
safety to be a sufficient basis for the implementation of manda-
tory testing.' The Supreme Court, in Von Raab, similarly
treated as sufficient the interest of the Customs Department in
ensuring that the physical and mental capabilities of Customs
officials carrying firearms remained unimpaired by drug use."'
While the substance of these cases is markedly distinct from
those pertaining to mandatory HIV testing, they are not entirely
irrelevant. The "special needs" doctrine could be incorporated
into the nation's HIV jurisprudence, providing some precedential
value to courts addressing these issues. " The government's in-
112 See id. at 666 (stating that the purposes of the drug testing program are re-
lated to substantial interests presenting a special need); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21
(stating that the safety of both the public and employees justifies prohibition on
drug or alcohol use, and that monitoring is needed to assure compliance with pro-
hibition).
113 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21. The Court's application of the "special needs"
doctrine in this context was contingent upon the assurances of the federal govern-
ment that the testing program was adopted as a means of deterring accidents,
rather than a means of providing evidence for the post-accident prosecution of em-
ployees. See id.
14 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672. The Court noted that "the Government has a
compelling interest in ensuring that front-line interdiction personnel are physically
fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment." Id. at 670. Additionally, "the
public should not bear the risk that employees who may suffer from impaired per-
ception and judgment will be promoted to positions where they may need to employ
deadly force." Id. at 671.
See Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th
Cir. 1990) (allowing HIV testing of hospital employees because the hospital's strong
interest in maintaining a safe workplace outweighed the employee's privacy inter-
est); Love v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660, 662 (Ct. App. 1990) (upholding a
statute mandating HIV testing for anyone convicted of soliciting prostitutes); Joh-
netta J. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 685 (Ct. App. 1990) (upholding a
state statute requiring an HIV test of anyone charged with interfering with official
duties of public safety employees through activities which may transfer blood or
bodily fluids, from the defendant to the public safety employee). The court found a
"special need" in allowing the test because the public has an interest in the health
and safety of such officers. Id. at 683; see also Allison N. Blender, Note, Testing the
Fourth Amendment for Infection: Mandatory AIDS and IHV Testing of Criminal De-
fendants at the Request of a Victim of Sexual Assault, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 467,
489 (1997) (noting that many agree that mandatory testing of sex offenders for HIV
would be determined under "special needs"); Lisa Simotas, Note, In Search of a Bal-
ance: Aids, Rape and the Special Needs Doctrine, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1881, 1898-99
(1991) (suggesting that EIV testing of rape defendants would meet the Supreme
Court's parameters of a "special need").
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terest in eliminating the spread of HIV would undoubtedly be
considered a sufficient basis to invoke the application of the
"special needs" doctrine. The subsequent use of the drug testing
rationales formulated in Skinner and Von Raab by the nation's
lower courts, however, has produced differing results,"' and may
provide little assistance in examining the constitutionality of
mandatory HIV testing programs. The Whalen balancing test
must be applied consistently to be effective.
B. Mandatory HIV Testing
The subject of mandatory HIV testing has long been the
topic of public outrage and debate. Initially, mandatory HIV
testing sought to protect the nation's blood supply.1 7  Subse-
quently, mandatory testing was aimed at military personnel."'
In recent years, however, efforts by various state legislatures to
expand mandatory HIV testing to specified groups in society, in-
cluding health care workers, public employees, prisoners, and
pregnant women and their newborns, have met with varying de-
grees of success. Many such proposals experienced intense op-
position and public outcry, and as a result, "AIDS is this nation's
most litigated disease[] ... present[ing] a wide range of issues not
associated with other disabilities.""' Consequently, many courts
recognize the "intensely personal and sensitive nature of H1V-
related information"" and appreciate the plight of those afflicted
16 See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 886
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the testing of those employed in positions deemed to im-
pact public health and safety directly by the Department of Transportation); Na-
tional Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(permitting random mandatory testing of civilian employees of the military occupy-
ing aviation, police guard, and drug counseling positions); Brown v. City of Detroit,
715 F. Supp. 832, 834-35 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that the random testing of the
city's police force did not violate the Fourth Amendment). But see Harmon v. Thorn-
burgh, 878 F.2d 484, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (striking down the random testing of Jus-
tice Department employees, except those holding top-secret national security clear-
ances); Transportation Inst. v. United States Coast Guard, 727 F. Supp. 648, 658
(D.D.C. 1989) (rejecting the random testing of Coast Guard employees such as wip-
ers and cooks as impairment from drug use would pose only a minimal public risk).
117 See GUNDERSON, supra note 31, at 39; see also 21 C.F.R. § 1270.5 (1997)
(requiring that donated blood shall be tested for -H).
118 See 32 C.F.R. § 58.4(b) (1997) (stating that it is Department of Defense policy
to screen military personnel for HIV).
19 Penn Lerblance, Legal Redress for Disability Discrimination: Bob, Carol, Ted
and Alice Encounter AIDS, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 307, 309 (1994) (discussing
issues in employment and housing discrimination based on HIV status).
10 Doughty, supra note 5, at 150; see also Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264,
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with the disease who are seeking to maintain their privacy. Yet,
despite this recognition, courts often afford states "particularly
wide latitude" when evaluating measures designed to safeguard
the public health."l
Few courts have been called upon to assess the constitu-
tionality of mandatory HIV testing, and thus far the Supreme
Court has managed to avoid consideration of the issue entirely.
As a result, there is little consistency in the area, further compli-
cating an already complex issue. Yet, in an attempt to invoke
some semblance of consistency into this area, courts have drawn
upon cases delineating a right to informational privacy.' As
such, the balancing test employed by Whalen and its progeny be-
came a cornerstone in this area, providing assistance to those
courts faced with these issues. Ultimately, the outcome of these
cases turns on the question of whether a legitimate governmen-
tal interest in ensuring public safety outweighs that of the indi-
vidual's privacy interest.'
In a number of the cases, prisoners seeking to maintain the
confidentiality of their HIV status have brought suit challenging
the constitutionality of mandatory HIV testing24 Of particular
267 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that there are certain health issues, such as AIDS,
that are so personal that control over disclosure of infection should be greatly main-
tained by the individual); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513 n.26 (11th Cir.
1991) (indicating that disclosure of information about AIDS is a sensitive and pri-
vate matter); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)
(acknowledging that "there are few matters of a more personal nature, and there
are few decisions over which a person could have a greater desire to exercise con-
trol, than the manner in which he reveals that [AIDS] diagnosis to others").
'2 See Doughty, supra note 5, at 152. Historically, courts considered states' ac-
tions in safeguarding public health in non-HIV related cases. See, e.g., Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (stating that the Court "has distinctly recog-
nized the authority of a State to enact quarantine laws and health laws of every de-
scription' ... [to] protect the public health and the public safety") (quotation citation
omitted in original); Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1382-83 (10th Cir. 1973)
(upholding the states' power to treat a person suspected of having a venereal dis-
ease without that person's permission).
122 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (stating that individuals have an
"interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"); Nixon v. Administrator of
Gen'l Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (recognizing a privacy interest in personal mat-
ters); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (stating that people have
"the right to be let alone"); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.
1983) (noting that there is a privacy interest in personal information that is to be
protected).
123 See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
'24 See Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that
prisoners do not have a privacy interest in their medical files); Doe v. Wigginton, 21
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relevance in this area is Harris v. Thigpen.' In Harris, the
prisoners brought suit challenging various policies and proce-
dures of the Alabama Department of Corrections ("DOC")."
Among these policies were the DOC's mandatory HIV testing ofinmates and its segregation of those inmates whose tests proved
to be seropositive."7 The inmates claimed that such policies re-
sulted in the nonconsensual disclosure of their HIV status, and
thus were unconstitutional violations of their rights of privacy.'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the finding of the lower court by
holding that the involuntary testing and segregation of prison
inmates was constitutionally permissible in light of the state's
compelling interest in promoting safety and preventing the
spread of AIDS within the prison system. 9
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a similar prison
testing program in Walker v. Sumner"' due to the state's failure
to articulate a legitimate governmental interest substantiating
the need for such testing. The plaintiff in Walker alleged that by
forcing him to submit to HIV testing by threatening to shoot him
with "laser" guns, the prison guards deprived him of his consti-
tutional rights.13" ' The court concluded that such forced testing
was unconstitutional in light of the prison's failure to assert a
F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that disclosure of a prisoner's HIV infection
did not violate the prisoner's privacy interests); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874,
877 (W.D. Wis. 1988), affd, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the unjustified
disclosure of a prisoner's HIV status to non-medical staff violated the prisoners
right to privacy); Baez v. Rapping, 680 F. Supp. 112, 116 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting
that the right to segregate prisoners with HIV had been upheld against First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth amendment challenges) (citing McDuffie v. Rikers Island
Med. Dep't, 668 F. Supp. 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
1'2 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
126 Id. at 1498. In an attempt to confront the AIDS epidemic that infiltrated
prisons, Alabama passed a statute that required all persons sentenced to prison in
Alabama to be tested for sexually transmitted diseases upon entry and prior to re-
lease. See id. at 1499 n.2.
See id. at 1500.
128 See id. at 1512. The court noted that attacking disclosure on the right to pri-
vacy forces it to enter an uncertain area of law. See id. at 1512 n.25 (citing Doe v.
Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (N.D.N.Y. 1988)).
See id at 1521. The state's compelling interest was predicated in part on the
fact that high-risk behaviors, such as homosexual relations, IV drug use, tattooing,
and frequent fighting occur "disproportionately in prison systems." Id. at 1519-20.
120 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id at 385. Specifically, the prisoner asserted that the involuntary AIDS test
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amend-
ment right, as well as violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See
id. at 384-85.
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"legitimate penological objective" in support of such testing.13 2
The governmental interests considered by the courts, in up-
holding the implementation of mandatory HIV testing programs
in prisons have not been confined to that context alone. Rather,
courts have recognized these interests as justifring mandatory
testing of public employees, which arguably contravenes their
privacy rights. Consider Anonymous Fireman v. City of Wil-
loughby,'3 where a firefighter challenged the City's ability to
implement routine mandatory HIV testing of firefighters and
paramedics as part of their annual physical examinations."3 The
district court rejected the plaintiffs contentions that the testing
program violated both his Fourth Amendment right as well as
his privacy rights, holding that "mandatory testing may be or-
dered for high-risk government employees such as firefighters
and paramedics.""5 The court reasoned that the City had a le-
gitimate interest in promoting and preserving the safety of its
citizens which outweighed the plaintiffs privacy interest. 6
However, the Eighth Circuit struck down a similar manda-
tory HIV testing program in Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Com-
munity Office of Retardation."7 The employees of a multi-county
health services agency, the Eastern Nebraska Community Office
of Retardation ("ENCOR"), brought suit to enjoin enforcement of
a policy of the Eastern Nebraska Human Services Agency
("ENSHA") requiring the employees to submit to mandatory
testing for HIV.1' ENSHA, dedicated to serving the needs of the
2 See id. at 386 ("In the instant case, defendants have introduced absolutely no
evidence to suggest that the mandatory AIDS test ... was based on a legitimate pe-
nolo~cal objective.").
779 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
1 See id. at 408. HIV testing was to be part of annual physical examinations
which certify the firefighters' fitness for duty. See id.
"' Id. at 418. The court specifically noted, however, that the holding in the case
was strictly limited and was not meant to stand for "the general proposition of man-
datory testing of all employees for AIDS, whether they be public or private, or man-
datory testing for AIDS of the general public." Id. The court considered that public
service industries such as the police and fire departments are highly regulated with
respect to an employee's performance. See id at 415 (citing Penny v. Kennedy, 915
F.2d 1065, 70 (6th Cir. 1990) (Wellford, J., concurring) (recognizing that the nature
of the police department requires strong regulation to ensure the safety of both the
public and the police department)).
"' See id. at 416. The court noted that the governmental interests include safety
for the employer and the public, continued fitness for duty of its employees, and
preventing the spread of the AIDS virus. See id
867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).1 See id. at 462. The policy was to test employees with direct client contact for
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mentally disabled, asserted that such testing was necessary in
order to prevent the transmission of HIV from workers to clients
"who engage in violent or aggressive behavior associated with
their conditions, such as biting and scratching . The court
weighed the employees' rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures against the protection mandatory testing
would afford.4" Since the risk of transmission was slight, the
mandatory test could not be justified, and thus it violated the
employees' constitutional rights.""
Although there is some disparity in the results of these
cases, the courts have consistently employed the Whalen balanc-
ing test. Moreover, the outcome has always depended upon
whether the states' interest in the disclosure of a person's HIV
status outweighs the individual person's right to privacy. As
such, this test becomes highly relevant in the subsequent analy-
sis regarding the legitimacy of mandatory HIV testing schemes
for newborns and pregnant women.
IV. MANDATORY TESTING FOR NEWBORNS AND PREGNANT
WOMEN: CROSSING THE LINE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The unprecedented number of newborns infected with the
HIV virus earlier this decade forced legislatures to examine the
viability of existing HIV testing policies.' Currently, forty-five
states have implemented programs which provide for the
anonymous testing of newborns for HIV." Test results are used
HIV and hepatitis B virus so as to attain a safe environment for both employees and
clients. See id.
"' Id. at 463.
See id. (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 483 U.S. 709 (1987) (parallel citations
omitted)).
1 See id, at 464 ("Because the risk of disease transmission has been shown to
be negligible in the ENCOR environment, ENSHA's articulated interest in requiring
testing does not constitutionally justify requiring employees to submit to a test for
the purpose of protecting the clients from an infected employee."). But see Leckelt v.
Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding
HIV testing of a nurse despite the low probability of transferring HIV to a patient);
Johnetta v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 685 (Ct. App. 1990) (upholding HIV
testing of a defendant who bit a police officer although transmission of HIV through
saliva is low).
142 See Study in Babies With HIV Suggests Early Treatment May Slow Virus,
L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1997, at B2 (suggesting early diagnosis and treatment may in-
hibit the AIDS virus). But see More Women With AIDS Virus Are Having Babies,
SEATLE TIMES, June 18, 1997, at A5 (highlighting a decrease in the former epi-
demic-level HIV-infected birth rates and an improvement in statistics overall).
" The five states which do not engage in the "blind" testing of newborns for
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for strictly statistical purposes and are not revealed either to the
infant's physician or his or her parents. Many view such testing
as a failure on the part of the government to insure the best in-
terests of our country's children.' In an effort to rectify this
perceived inadequacy on the part of the government and to re-
duce the number of pediatric AIDS cases, various state legisla-
tures, as well as members of Congress, have introduced manda-
tory testing proposals for newborns.' Proponents of mandatory
testing assert that such testing is justified despite its impact on
the mother's constitutional rights. Knowledge of the infant's
HIV status would allow for early intervention and treatment,
enhancing the quality and duration of the child's life, and possi-
bly prolonging it until a cure is discovered.'46 These advocates
view early intervention and diagnosis as "essential in maximiz-
ing the benefits of available treatments."47 Additionally, propo-
nents contend that mandatory testing will foreclose the possibil-
ity of an unidentified infant leaving the hospital without the
opportunity for early treatment.
48
However, despite the emotional appeal of this position, the
highly critical opponents of mandatory testing continue to assert
the unconstitutionality of such testing. While these opponents
H1V are Idaho, Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Vermont. See Nat Hen-
toff, Sweet Land Of Liberty - Privacy That Kills, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1995, at A19.
144 Cf 143 CONG. REC. H817-01, at H817 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1997) (statement of
Rep. McGovern); 135 CONG REC. E2825-02, at E2827 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989)
(statement of Dannemeyer). See generally Eric J. Kupeman, Note, The Mark of
Cain: No Second Chance for Teachers Convicted of Sex Offenses Against Students, 3
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 491, 520 (1996) (addressing children's best interests).
1* See Molinari Bill Would Use Block Grant For Infant Drug Testing, AL-
COHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY., June 30, 1997, at 1 (proposing the use of block
grant funds to perform mandatory drug and alcohol testing of newborn children).
14 See Leonardo Renna, Note, New York State's Proposal To Unblind HIV Test-
ing For Newborns: A Necessary Step In Addressing A Critical Problem, 60 BROOK L.
REV. 407, 415-17 (1994).
'47 Id, at 416. Among the purported benefits of early treatment and intervention
are the "administration of prophylaxis, antiretroviral drugs, intravenous immuno-
globulin, specialized immunization schedules and close nutritional monitoring." Id.
at 416-17. For a more complete description of these benefits and their various posi-
tive effects, see id. at 417-20.
148 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 619.
"9 Cf Nina Loewenstein, Mandatory Screening of Newborns for HIV An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 43, 43 (1996). The author
argued that the benefits of testing did not justify mandatory testing, stating that
[Piroponents of mandatory [HIVI testing tend to 1) overstate the medical
benefits of universally testing infants for 11V at birth; 2) minimize the im-
pact of the IV test for the woman herself, and her legal rights concerning
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are quick to point out the mother's constitutional rights of pri-
vacy, equal protection, and due process,15 they do not predicate
their analysis solely on these constitutional principles. Of par-
ticular significance is the argument that "the social stigma ac-
companying a positive HIV test would discourage mothers from
seeking prenatal care, which is generally considered the best
protection against HIV perinatal transmission and the most ef-
fective means of ensuring the health of the child." 5' The oppo-
nents contend that the imposition of mandatory testing schemes
will foster distrust among patients, thereby alienating the
mother from the health care system.5 2 It is in the midst of this
ongoing and often heated debate that the legislatures of various
states, as well as the United States Congress, have promulgated
legislation calling for the implementation of mandatory testing
policies, adding fuel to a fire already burning out of control. 53
A. Summary of Legislative Proposals for Mandatory Testing of
Newborns
Proposals for the mandatory testing of newborns for HIV
have been advanced by both state and national government offi-
cials and have taken on a variety of forms.1'' Among the most
contested of these proposals was one introduced by New York
Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn. Mayersohn's proposal
sought to change the practice of New York's Newborn HIV Sero-
prevalence Survey, conducted by the State since 1987 to anony-
mously trace the HIV epidemic in New York's newborns.' 55 In its
HIV testing;, and 3) minimize the importance of the mother's role in facili-
tating medical care for her infant as well as question her competence as
the infant's caretaker.
1W See GUNDERSON, supra note 31, at 38-40, 82-87.
'5' Goldstein, supra note 10, at 619. "[Mandatory testing may cause a backlash
in some cases and result in women avoiding natal assistance altogether." Id. at 620.
152 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 619.
11 See Dennis Farney, Test of Faith: Three GOP Freshmen Advance Agenda,
Even as Revolution Falters Congressmen Share Prayer, Distaste for Washington,
and Doubts on Gingrich, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1996, at Al, A8 (explaining the use of
federal funds as leverage to mandate HIV-testing of newborns); Christina Kent,
States Pushed to Test Newborns for HIV, AM. MED. NEws, May 27, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 7990346 (addressing the Senate and the House of Representatives'
agreement to implement mandatory HIV testing).
54 See supra notes 140-43 and infra notes 153-62.
"s See Julie D. Levinson, Note, While Ignorance May Not Be Bliss, It Is A
Mother's Right: Constitutional Implications of Testing Newborn Babies For HIV, 3
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 71, 71-73 (1996).
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initial form, Mayersohn's proposal mandated HIV testing for all
babies born in the State and the disclosure of all positive results
to the infant's mother.'56 The proposal did not require maternal
consent prior to testing, but did include mandatory disclosure of
the test results to the mother.'57 The multitude of constitutional
implications associated with the bill led to its defeat in 1993,
1994, and 1995. The bill was extensively modified in 1996 in an
effort to ensure its passage with the true intent of the bill
masked in ambiguous language.58 The bill as modified was ul-
timately passed in June of 1996." 9 The law is worded broadly
enough to authorize mandatory testing without expressly provid-
ing for such.
160
At least two state legislatures have considered bills similar
to that of New York.' 6' At the national level, the Ryan White
Care Amendments were adopted by the United States Congress
in May of 1996.162 The final draft represents a compromise be-
tween the divergent viewpoints of those in favor of mandatory
testing and those opposed."i The amendments call for a program
which will encourage pregnant women to submit voluntarily to
HIV testing.'4 However, if the voluntary effort should fail, the
amendments may be modified to mandate "that all newborns
whose biological mother has not undergone prenatal testing for
'5 See N.Y. Assembly 6684-B, 218th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (N.Y. 1995).
157 See id.
153 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney 1997).
159 See id.
150 See id. The law as enacted reads in part:
In order to improve the health outcomes of newborns, and to improve ac-
cess to care and treatment for newborns infected with or exposed to human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and their mothers, the commissioner shall
establish a comprehensive program for the testing of newborns for the
presence of human immunodeficiency virus and/or the presence of antibod-
ies to such virus.
Id.
161 See S.B. 2314, 13th Leg., 2d Sess. (Fla. 1994) (providing that mothers of new-
born infants be informed of the R3V test results in a post-test counseling session);
A.B. 881 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1997-98) (mandating the disclosure of any positive
result to the newborn's parent(s) or guardian(s)). The Florida bill was ultimately de-
feated, and the California statute is still under consideration.
'62 See Ryan White CARE Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-146, 110
Stat. 1346 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. 300ff (West Supp.
1997)).
'63 See Helen Dewar, AIDS Testing Compromise Is Reached; Hill Negotiators
Agree On Prenatal Program, WASH. POST, May 2, 1996, at A9.1'4 See id.
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HIV, be tested for HIV at birth and that the results be made
available to the biological mother or guardian of the infant."' If
mandatory testing becomes necessary, failure to adhere to these
requirements would render a state ineligible for federal fund-
ing.'" While such funding would provide a strong incentive to
adhere to the requirements, in the event that voluntary testing
efforts fail, strong opposition may make enforcement impossible.
The defeat of the majority of the legislative measures ap-
pears indicative of the view that mandatory testing is repugnant
both to constitutional ideals of privacy and freedom. In light of
these principles, perhaps the New York bill and the federal legis-
lation are little more than political victories for their sponsors,
with no cognizable benefits flowing to the nation's HIV-infected
infants.
B. The Constitutional Quagmire Surrounding Compulsory
Testing of Newborns
Mandatory HIV testing of newborns raises important issues
regarding a mother's constitutional rights,'67 foremost of which is
the violation of the right of privacy." Although the right to pri-
vacy is not absolute,169 it is considered to be fundamental.7 ° Ac-
cordingly, a compelling state interest, with narrowly tailored
means to achieve that interest, must justify any privacy right in-
fringements. 7' Whether a measure satisfies the criteria depends
upon whether the interests of the state outweigh the individual's
'6 S. REP. No. 104-25, at 45 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 989, 1033.
'6 See id.
'7 See Shelton, supra note 20, at B13 (recognizing the view that "mandatory
disclosure violates privacy and amounts to mandatory testing of the mothers").
' See generally Levinson, supra note 153, at 75-93 (discussing the Court's
fashioning of a fundamental right of privacy). For a general discussion of the right of
privacy, see TRIBE, supra note 14, §§ 15-1 to 15-10, at 1302-62.
'6 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (stating that the right of privacy
"is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation").
170 See id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding a fundamental
right of privacy in the marital relationship); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (supporting a fundamental right of privacy in use of contraceptives by mar-
ried persons).
See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3418, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at
5 U.S.C. 522a (1994)) ("The right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right
protected by the Constitution of the United States[.]") (emphasis added). See gener-
ally TRIBE, supra note 14, §§ 11-3 to 11-4, at 774-80, §§ 15-1 to 15-10, at 1302-62.
[Vol. 72:103
MANDATORY H1V TESTING
privacy interests in autonomy, dignity, and confidentiality.7 2
1. The State's Authority For Implementation of Mandatory
Testing: To Protect State Interests
A court, in determining the constitutionality of mandatory
newborn HIV testing, must balance the state's interests in pre-
serving public health against the mother's privacy interests. The
state's interest must satisfy the compelling interest test in order
to warrant an invasion of the mother's privacy. The compelling
state interest in mandatory HIV testing is to protect public
health generally and the infant's health specifically.73 Grounds
to justify state attempts at mandatory testing include the Tenth
Amendment "police powers"'74 the "parens patriae" doctrine, 75
and the "best interests of the child" analysis.'76
The Tenth Amendment, reserving for the state those powers
not delegated to the federal government, grants the state the
legislative authority to protect the public health and welfare. 7
The "police powers" have consistently been relied upon to vali-
date state interference in the family realm. 8
172 See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 15-1, at 302-04.
173 See Malloy, supra note 20, at 1204.
174 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple." U.S. CONST. amend. Y See Marian V. Heacock & Gregory P. Orvis, AIDS in the
Workplace: Public and Corporate Policy, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 689, 694 (1990)
(recognizing states' police powers to enforce mandatory testing); Malloy, supra note
20, at 1193-96 (addressing Tenth Amendment police powers).
'75 See Maia E. Scott, Note, Tests for Pediatric AIDS: Are We Failing Our Chil-
dren?, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Z & L. 217, 238 (1995) (noting that a state's interest in this
capacity may outweigh constitutional objections if supported by compelling policy
considerations).
176 See Malloy, supra note 20, at 1210 (evaluating the consideration of the child's
best interest to justify mandatory testing).
'7 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575 (1985) (5-4
decision) (Powell, J., dissenting) (recognizing the Constitutional limitations on the
federal government's interference with states' rights); Ploughman, supra note 22, at
194; see, e.g., Alexander H. Southwell, Comment, The County Supremacy Movement:
The Federalism Implications of a 1990's States'Rights Battle, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 417,
474 (1996-97) (discussing violations of the Tenth Amendment for improper in-
fringements on state rights and functions).
78 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 625 (recognizing that "[p]arents ... well-
established legal right to make important decisions for their children ... is not abso-
lute"); see also Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97, 98 (1904) (providing that the state's
police power encompassed the right to preclude the admission of children who were
not immunized against highly contagious diseases into the public schools because
the State's exercise would promote the public health, safety or welfare).
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Additionally, the power of the state to interfere in family
decision-making has been bolstered through the application of
the doctrine of "parens patriae," which allows the state to pro-
tect the interests of the child.1 9 The "parens patriae" doctrine
has been applied in a variety of cases in which the need to en-
sure the child's welfare has been balanced against the privacy
rights of the parents.'O However, application of the doctrine has
largely been limited to those instances in which a child's physical
or mental health was threatened.1
8 1
A final source of state power-the "best interests of the
child" doctrine-developed in response to cases where parents re-
fused to allow their child to receive the appropriate, and often-
times necessary, medical care. 82 Application of this doctrine re-
quires an initial determination as to whether an identifiable
state interest exists to justify intervening on the child's behalf.'3
If such an interest is found, the court must then determine
whether that interest is "sufficiently substantial to outweigh the
parents' interest."" In performing this analysis the court con-
siders a number of factors including the seriousness of the harm
the child is suffering, the potential effectiveness of treatment,
the invasiveness of treatment and its effect on the child.'8
Courts have successfully applied the "best interests of the child"
doctrine in cases where treatment was necessary to save a child's
life.'86 However, the courts have not applied the doctrine where
the life of a child was not threatened or the child's condition was
'7 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 625 (discussing the principles of the "parens
patriae" doctrine).
180 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (weighing a parent's right
to due process against the state's "parens patriae" interest in the welfare of the child
as applied in the termination of parental rights context); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (holding that the state may infringe upon a parent's
constitutional rights under the "parens patriae" doctrine if the parent's decision will
jeopardize the health or safety of a child).
181 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 627. The Supreme Court has held that the
"parens patriae" doctrine does not allow a state to interfere unless the child's health
is threatened. See id.
18 See id at 627-28 ("IT1he best interests doctrine allows the court discretion to
supply its own objective judgment to determine what is in the child's best interest.").
1 See id.
18 Id at 628.
18 See id However, "the underlying consideration is the child's welfare and
whether his best interests will be served by the medical treatment." In re Eric B.,
235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1987) (quoting In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51
(Ct. App. 1979)).
18 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 628.
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incurable.'8 7
Any attempt to justify mandatory testing on the basis of
these doctrines will prove to be futile, because the legitimacy of
these positions is completely undermined when considered in
conjunction with mandatory testing of newborns for HIV. First,
application of the "police powers" rationale is questionable due to
the fact that there is little threat of public transmission through
newborns. Newborns are incapable of engaging in high-risk be-
haviors, such as intravenous drug use or sexual intercourse,
which behaviors would pose a threat to the public health. Simi-
larly, the doctrines of "parens patriae" and the "best interests of
the child" are inapplicable because the administration of HIV
treatment is costly, invasive, and ultimately ineffective. Moreo-
ver, when a disease is incurable, the ability to prolong an infant's
life is an insufficient basis for overriding the parent's wishes re-
garding testing.' As a result, these doctrines cannot justify the
invasiveness of mandatory HIV testing.
2. Constitutional Basis for a Ban on Mandatory Testing: The
Mother's Right to Privacy
As previously noted, the right to privacy is a multi-faceted
one, protecting a variety of activities and information. Manda-
tory testing infringes upon several aspects of a mother's right to
privacy: the right to bodily integrity and autonomy in personal
decision-making, the right to make one's own medical decisions,
and the right to confidentiality in one's personal medical infor-
mation. Each of the foregoing components of the privacy right
has been specifically afforded protection by this nation's courts. 89
It has been suggested that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of [the individ-
'87 See id at 628-29.
"8 See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425-26 (Mass. 1977) (stating that "[there is a substantial distinction in the State's
insistence that human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the
State interest where ... the issue is not whether but when, for how long, and at what
cost to the individual that life may be briefly extended").
1" See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (acknowledging
an individual's liberty interest in autonomy and bodily integrity); Cruzan v. Mis-
souri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing the right to refuse un-
wanted medical care as a constitutionally protected "liberty interest"); Doe v. City of
New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the right to privacy encom-
passes the right to confidentiality of one's personal medical information).
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ual's] own person, free from all restraint or interference of oth-
ers, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."9' This
recognition of the right to bodily integrity is linked to the doc-
trine of informed consent, which requires that the individual be
provided with all of the information necessary to enable her to
make an informed decision regarding whether or not to pursue
specified medical treatment. Mandatory testing of HIV in new-
borns violates this well established medical doctrine since the
mother has no choice regarding her child's testing. Her child
will be tested and the test results disclosed to her despite any
wishes she may possess to the contrary. In spite of this lack of
informed consent, proponents argue that the mother's right to
bodily integrity is not directly implicated because the test is not
forced upon the mother herself, but rather upon her newborn
child. They view mother and child as entirely separate-but
such a view is inaccurate in light of the fact that the newborn
may retain its mother's antibodies up until the age of eighteen
months. 9' Medical evidence such as this reveals this distinction
as a mere mincing of words, requiring those in favor of testing to
ignore the fact that the most commonly used methods of HIV
testing are more accurate indicators of the mother's HIV status
than that of the newborn. 92
Moreover, implicit in the right to bodily integrity is the right
to refuse medical treatment, a right which should be extended to
encompass the right to refuse knowledge of one's HIV status.
The decision of whether or not to learn one's own health status,
like the decision whether to terminate one's life through the re-
fusal of medical treatment, involves "the most intimate and per-
sonal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy."'93 Mandatory testing of new-
borns strips a mother of such "dignity and autonomy"" and es-
sentially forces her to submit to medical decisions made by the
state on her behalf without consulting her. Yet, the multitude of
costs associated with the disease imposes the greatest burden on
1g Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
"" See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 612 n.16. For this reason, after 18 months,
70-80% of infants who initially tested positive for HIV will subsequently test nega-
tive. See id. (citing John M. Naber & David R. Johnson, Mandatory HIV Testing Is-
sues in State Newborn Screening Programs, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 55, 57 (1992-93)).
192 See Naber, supra note 189, at 59.
"3 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
194 id.
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the mother, not the state legislatures. As a result, new mothers
should be afforded the opportunity "to decline forced disclosure
of this information."'95
Additionally, the right not to know can also be derived from
the right to confidentiality,"s which implies a right to non-
disclosure in general.' If this premise is correct, and it is as-
serted that it is, violations of the mother's right to confidentiality
can occur on two separate levels. First, the disclosure of the
newborn's test results to the mother may serve as a violation of
confidentiality in and of itself. Case law has established that
"direct disclosure by the State to a third party is not a necessary
predicate to an invasion of privacy."98 The recognition of this
principle undermines the position of proponents who claim that
there is no invasion of privacy because the test results are only
revealed to the same person to whom they are confidential. 99
Second, where the mother is absent for whatever reason, the re-
sults may be disclosed to the biological father or legal guard-
ian."° The revelation of the test results to a third party under
these circumstances is an undeniable breach of the mother's
right to confidentiality. As a result, the mother's decision to re-
main uninformed of the child's test results should be respected.
3. Practical Considerations Supporting a Ban on Mandatory
Testing
Apart from the constitutional dilemmas associated with
mandatory testing, there exist various pragmatic considerations
that militate against the implementation of such testing re-
gimes. These include: (i) the costs associated with testing and
the absence of a guarantee for funding follow-up care; (ii) fear of
19 Mlichael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Blood Test Results to the
Individuals Tested: A Matter of Personal Choice Neglected, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445,
448 (1991).
190 See Goldstein, supra note 10, at 633 (arguing that confidentiality of IV
status as determined by the court in Doe v. City of New York implies a woman's
right "not to know.").
197 See id.
'93 Cumin, supra note 38, at 876. "Simply the taking and recording by state
agencies of personal matters is sufficient to infringe individual privacy." Id.; see also
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab.,
No. 96-16526, 1998 WL 3209 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 1998); United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
' See Cumin, supra note 38, at 877.
2 See id. at 878.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
discrimination and care avoidance; (iii) the alienation of the
mother; (iv) the debatable benefits of early detection and treat-
ment; and (v) the availability of a superior alternative.2"'
i) No Guarantee for Funding
Approximately four million infants were born in the United
States in 1994, of that number, approximately 7,000 mothers
were HIV-infected. °2 Mandatory testing of all infants would re-
quire an exorbitant expenditure of funds in order to identify the
1,500-2,000 newborns born HIV positive.2°  While the govern-
ment has expressed its willingness to provide funding for such
testing, it has failed to guarantee any capital for treatment of
those infants identified as HIV positive.21 "To surprise unpre-
pared mothers with the doubly traumatic news that they are
HIV-positive and their baby may also be" without providing ac-
cess to funding for treatment is both cruel and irresponsible."5
Thus, this absence of a linkage to treatment further emphasizes
the impropriety of a mandatory testing scheme which compels
disclosure and all its attendant burdens, without the promise or
the hope of any benefits.
ii) Fear of Discrimination Will Result in Avoidance of Care
The knowledge that one is HIV positive brings with it a va-
riety of social implications. Victims of the fatal virus have been
subjected to intense discrimination in virtually all aspects of life
by those whose fear overshadows their reason2 In particular,
HIV positive individuals have been the victims of discrimination
2' See id. at 875-76. For a more extensive discussion of these considerations, see
id at 875-95.
2"2 See Preventing AIDS at Birth, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 6, 1995, at B6, avail-
able in 1995 WL 4103020 (noting that HIV tests cost about twenty five dollars each
to administer per pregnant mother).20 See Thomas C. Quinn et al., Early Diagnosis of Perinatal HIV Infection by
Detection of Viral-Specific IgA Antibodies, 266 JAMA 3439 (1991).24 See Scott, supra note 173, at 240 ("Identifying a child as HIV-positive pro-
vides only the potential for intervention and treatment, it guarantees neither access
to health care nor success.").
m Cumin, supra note 38, at 883.
206 See id at 879. A 1990 survey revealed that 86% of the nation believed that
those who contracted AIDS through blood transfusions should be treated with com-
passion, while less than 50% believed that people who contracted AIDS through
homosexual activity should be treated with compassion. Richard A. Knox and Renee
Graham, Most Favor Bigger U.S. Role in AIDS Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17,
1990, at 1.
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in employment, housing, insurance, education (particularly chil-
dren), and health care."7 Perhaps the most devastating effect of
learning that one is HIV positive is the potential for rejection
and abandonment of the mother and her newborn by friends and
family incapable of showing compassion or sympathy.
It is this threat of isolation and discrimination, which almost
inevitably accompanies a positive test result, that will lead many
individuals, particularly those who are high-risk, to avoid the
health care system altogether if a mandatory testing scheme is
implemented. 8 Such "care avoidance" 9 will ultimately under-
mine the goals of mandatory testing, placing the lives of the chil-
dren it intended to benefit in even greater danger because they
will receive no medical care at all. Additionally, "care avoidance"
will foreclose the potential benefits of counseling aimed at con-
vincing women to submit to HIV testing, because many women
will never even enter a hospital's doors let alone speak with
someone concerning a very delicate matter.
iii) Alienation of the Mother
"Mandatory testing reflects a policy that ignores the needs
and views of the mother."210 This failure on the part of the state
to recognize the mother's needs and views is counterproductive
to her role as a child care provider.21' Mandatory testing places
the mother and her rights in a position inferior to that of the
newborn until the mother is needed to provide the care and su-
pervision that the state is incapable of giving. The ultimate suc-
cess of the testing program, which hinges upon the mother's
willingness to cooperate with the state in safeguarding the
health of the newborn, is highly unlikely if the rights of the
mother are ignored until a time when it is convenient for the
state to acknowledge her role.2" In fact, mandatory testing's
207 See Cumin, supra note 38, at 879-80.
20' See id. at 881. " 'Care avoidance' is the term used to describe this unfortunate
cycle" that would cause a woman to "shun prenatal care ... rather than risk being
exposed." Id.
219 Id. "This avoidance of prenatal care contributes to America's dismal overall ...
infant mortality rates for minorities." Scott H. Isaacman, Are We Outlawing Moth-
erhood for HIV-Infected Women?, 22 LOY. U. CFH. L.J. 479, 482 (1991).220 Cumin, supra note 38, at 886.
211 See id.
212 The State is putting the rights of the mother and the rights of the child in
conflict. The issue is not whose rights come first but how both mother and child
should be treated as a unit. Improvements in family health care are made, not by
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neglect of the mother will likely render the potential benefits as-
sociated with early detection unattainable.
iv) Benefits of Early Detection and Treatment Are Debatable
Proponents of mandatory testing contend that it is a neces-
sary solution to a vital problem: allowing for early detection and
appropriate care, which will ultimately benefit the newborn.
Yet, such advocates tend to exaggerate the benefits of early de-
tection. While testing may improve the infant's quality of life,
and may even prolong that life, it cannot prevent the child's ul-
timate death. Questions invariably arise as to whether the ex-
tension of the child's life is in fact a benefit due to the lack of a
cure.213 Those in favor of testing assert that it is, in fact, a bene-
fit because it increases the possibility that the child will be alive
when a cure is found.
However, the validity of this position is open to attack.
There are some who may perceive the extension of the suffering
child's life as cruel. They may believe that subjecting the child to
aggressive therapy, and the severe psychological consequences
associated with the knowledge of their impending death, is the
ultimate act of selfishness. Proponents of this view consider the
debate from a primarily monetary standpoint. They state that
"[ulnless a cure is found, there are no economic benefits to pro-
longing the life of a child with HIV."214
Yet, such a narrow view may be entirely too pessimistic and
as such raises a number of ethical and moral considerations in-
capable of being analyzed in terms of dollars and cents. Unfor-
tunately, there is no definitive answer to this debate and there
will not be such an answer until a cure is found. For now, it is
up to each individual to ascertain whether mandatory testing is
justified on the grounds that it may prolong, but not save, the
child's life.
dividing the family unit, but by strengthening the unit. See id. at 886 n.159.
13 In one survey conducted in six neonatal intensive care units in New York
City, respondent doctors said that even if an lIV test were available, they would
withhold treatment because an infected newborn's quality of life is greatly dimin-
ished by pain and suffering. See Betty Wolder Levin, et al., Treatment Choice For
Infants in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at Risk for AIDS, 265 JAMA 2976, 2978
(1991).
214 Scott, supra note 173, at 239.
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v) Availability of a Superior Alternative
Proponents of mandatory testing tend to overemphasize its
purported benefits while ignoring its negative implications. In
so doing they have blinded themselves to the application of a su-
perior alternative, namely voluntary testing linked with counsel-ing.21 The successful utilization of such programs negates the
claims of mandatory testing proponents regarding the inefficacy
of voluntary testing. A prime example of a successful counseling
and voluntary testing program can be found at Harlem Hospital,
which serves a highly concentrated at-risk population.216 Coun-
selors at this hospital achieved cooperation rates of more than
90% after advising expectant mothers of the potential benefits of
testing and early identification. 7 Similar successes have been
achieved at John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Cooks County
Hospital in Chicago, Grady Hospital in Atlanta, and several
other sites."8
These success rates are indicative of the immense advan-
tages of a voluntary testing scheme. Foremost among these ad-
vantages is the overwhelming willingness of pregnant and par-
turient women to consent to testing when it is voluntary,
confidential, and linked to available care and services. 219 Thus,
voluntary testing, which is less invasive than mandatory testing,
serves to eliminate the problems associated with care avoidance,
dramatically increasing the likelihood that the newborn will re-
ceive the appropriate treatment. As one commentator has as-
serted, "[sioliciting informed cooperation from the mother,
through pre- and post-natal counseling, reduces the likelihood of
care avoidance, increases the likelihood of cooperation with test
results and follow-up care, avoids alienation of the mother, and
maximizes the likelihood of positive, voluntary behavioral
change."'o These enormous benefits clearly indicate that volun-
tary testing will prove to be the most effective means of achiev-
ing the asserted goal of mandatory testing: a reduction in the
215 See Cumin, supra note 38, at 893.
216 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 20-22. "[The women primarily affected by HIV
are likely to be low-income women of color." Id. at 20.
217 See id. at 22 (citing NEW YORK STATE AIDS ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF
THE SUBCOMM. ON NEWBORN HIv SCREENING 6 (1994)).218 For a thorough description of the success rates of these hospitals, see Cooper,
supra note 20, at 22.
219 See id. at 22.
220 Cumin, supra note 38, at 894.
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transmission of HIV from mother to child.
V. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY TESTING
As previously noted, the mandatory testing of newborns for
the HIV virus raises a number of constitutional, social, and ethi-
cal concerns.2' The consequences of validating such testing has
the potential to reach far beyond the present and may be used as
a precedent for the future restriction of other constitutional lib-
erties. Accordingly, any determination as to the validity of such
testing must take into account the rights and liberties that may
be imperiled. There are several possible, and disturbing, future
scenarios associated with the validation of mandatory testing of
newborns for HIV. First, the potential exists for the mandatory
loss of child custody by mothers identified as HIV positive. Ap-
plication of the "best interests of the child" doctrine may lead a
state to consider the inevitable demise of the mother and the re-
sulting inability of such parent to care adequately for her child
or children as primary factors in removing the children from the
home. Loss of custody might also be predicated upon the state's
interest in preventing the further transmission of the virus to
other members of the mother's family. Such a possibility would
contravene the mother's right to autonomy in decision-making
protected by the Constitution.
A more troubling possibility is that of the mandatory testing
of all pregnant women. The state may ultimately determine that
newborn testing is an inadequate means of safeguarding its in-
terests and seek to implement programs mandating testing for
all pregnant women. The constitutional infringement of the
mother's privacy rights, at issue in the context of newborn test-
ing, would be intensified under such a testing regime. While
many might contend that this result is unlikely to occur, there is
always the possibility that once the first step is taken the state
will not hesitate to continue down that road by imposing further
restrictions.
Moreover, if mandatory testing of pregnant women were
validated, it could provide the impetus for an even greater in-
trusion into the mother's life. Using the same logic, a state or
the federal government might advocate forced abortions, forced
sterilization or the possible criminal prosecution of mothers
2"1 See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
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guilty of transmitting the HIV virus to their infants. If these
measures ever became reality, a woman's rights with respect to
her reproductive freedom would be entirely abrogated, as would
over twenty years of case law dedicated to the development of
those rights. Under these circumstances "[t]he government
would be 'protecting' the child in the odd sense that it would be
preventing it from being born, despite its seventy percent chance
of being uninfected."' Although these are severe and unlikely
scenarios, the logic underpinning the impetus for mandatory
testing would also support such measures.
Our Constitutional history is indicative of our hatred of tyr-
anny, suppression, and restriction. Americans have always
viewed governmental systems employing such methods with dis-
trust and repugnance. If we hope to avoid living with the reality
of such measures, we must resist the implementation of manda-
tory HIV testing for newborns. Failure to do so could propel us
into a world reminiscent of that described by Orwell where:
There was ... no way of knowing whether you were being
watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system,
the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was
guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched every-
body all the time .... You had to live-did live, from habit that
became instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made
was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scru-
tinized.-
This leaves us with one final question to ponder: Do we want
BIG BROTHER watching us?
Kellie E. Lagitch
2' Martha A. Field, Pregnancy and AIDS, 52 MD. L. REV. 402,416-17 (1993).
22 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 6-7 (1949).
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